Reading notes of Secondary lit on Derrida on Schmitt

COP: friend/enemy
Movement essay by Agamben = ‘politicization’
-like chantal mouffe?  (use of arendt?)
-“people” = biopolitical existence
derrida = non-politicization?
///////
secondary lit on POF, on Schmitt
Adam Thurschwell — agamben against derrida (but spectrality of friend/enemy = friend could be enemy…)
John Caputo — (p193 of article)
woman is the partisan to schmitt’s theory (PF156-7)
because of “absolute enemy”
‘political value’ = readiness to kill…
so friendship depends upon being prepared to kill the other…
necessity of enemy: (PF, 248)
strange logic of potential annihilation of/by other — like game theory?
Caputo’s reading — [p194-5]
The response to Schmitt, for Derrida, is the “double gesture”: we must recognize that in fact this “logic of fraternization” is what “politics” has in fact tended to mean while inventing something beyond this politics, something other than a concept of what Schmitt calls the “political,” and we must also, at the same time, retain the old name “politics” and attempt to think it 0therwise. That would come down to the hope and the dream, the prayer and the tear, for a politics to come, something that Schmitt–and Heidegger–would regard as a very feminized, effete Kampflosigkeit, a state and culture lacking political definition that would make a real man blush. He dreams of a politics which affirms the impossibility of murder and is deeply troubled by the murderousness of the “same,” which is a Levinasian way to put much of what is going on in Derrida’s text. This formulation also opens Levinas up to a feminist reading, which to a certain extent is adumbrated in Politics of Friendship. Democracy is the stuff of another dream or another nonpaternal faith. For remember that fraternity, too, is a faith, one that brothers put in each other when they lock arms. The brother is not a fact or a given, but the effect of an oath and a faith, not nature, but a crediting or promise, indeed, a construction of patriarchy, while the demand to denaturalize the untouchable givenness of the brother is “deconstruction at work” (PF, 159), the work of a deconstructive politics.
finally [196]:
Derrida’s analysis concludes, rightly in my judgment, because it is so close to his point of departure, with a discussion of Blanchot, whose work stands in very close proximity with that of Levinas (PF, 296). For Blanchot, “we must give up trying to know those to whom we are linked by something essential” and concede that, because we cannot enclose the friend within our knowledge, we can only speak to, but not about, the friend. Words touch words from across a distance that cannot be crossed, “from one shore to the other shore, speech responding to someone who speaks from the other shore.” The function of our speech is to greet or welcome one who exceeds us, a “who” to whom we speak, not a “what” about which we speak. The interval that separates us does not destroy the relation with the friend but defines its peculiar nature. For it is the very withdrawal of the friend that draws us out of ourselves toward the friend, in a ceaseless, albeit futile, act of going where we cannot go, in the happy futility of a pursuit that Blanchot calls le pas au-dela, the step (pas) beyond I can not (pas) take, the “passage” that is always made and always blocked. This interval does not confine us to solitude but summons up speech and communication, if only at times the speech of silent companionship. The nonknowing, then, would not be a matter of withholding confidences from each other, but an affirmation of the other that presupposes and affirms the “interruption of being” between us, that protects the unfathomability of the friend. So deep is this interval that we might be tempted to say that nothing essential is changed with death, that death makes this distance all the more profound. But that would be an illusion, for with death, we lose not only the proximity but also the distance of the friend, not only the approach but also the withdrawal. When we settle all our differences with the dead friend, that is a false and easy illusion, for the differences have in fact been erased. Speech “subsides,” authentic dialogue dies away, and we are left with imaginary dialogues and a memory that Blanchot calls a “deceptive consolation.” The memory of the friend is “thought’s profound grief,” which arises from thought’s higher knowledge that memory does not in truth remember, that memory is lost in oblivion. Thought “must accompany friendship into oblivion,” preserving the friend’s absence as such, into a simpler and more painful separation. In a passage calculated to confound common sense, Blanchot says that friendship is “unshared, without reciprocity,.., that which has passed leaving no trace. This is passivity’s response to the un-presence of the unknown.” This is the “disaster” that does not destroy friendship but without which there is no friendship, for friendship flourishes in the midst of the disaster.( n4)
n4.For the pertinent passages in Blanchot, see Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 291, and Writing the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 27.

COP: friend/enemyMovement essay by Agamben = ‘politicization’ -like chantal mouffe?  (use of arendt?) -“people” = biopolitical existence
derrida = non-politicization?

///////secondary lit on POF, on SchmittAdam Thurschwell — agamben against derrida (but spectrality of friend/enemy = friend could be enemy…)
John Caputo — (p193 of article)  woman is the partisan to schmitt’s theory (PF156-7) because of “absolute enemy”  ‘political value’ = readiness to kill…so friendship depends upon being prepared to kill the other…
necessity of enemy: (PF, 248)
strange logic of potential annihilation of/by other — like game theory?
Caputo’s reading — [p194-5]The response to Schmitt, for Derrida, is the “double gesture”: we must recognize that in fact this “logic of fraternization” is what “politics” has in fact tended to mean while inventing something beyond this politics, something other than a concept of what Schmitt calls the “political,” and we must also, at the same time, retain the old name “politics” and attempt to think it 0therwise. That would come down to the hope and the dream, the prayer and the tear, for a politics to come, something that Schmitt–and Heidegger–would regard as a very feminized, effete Kampflosigkeit, a state and culture lacking political definition that would make a real man blush. He dreams of a politics which affirms the impossibility of murder and is deeply troubled by the murderousness of the “same,” which is a Levinasian way to put much of what is going on in Derrida’s text. This formulation also opens Levinas up to a feminist reading, which to a certain extent is adumbrated in Politics of Friendship. Democracy is the stuff of another dream or another nonpaternal faith. For remember that fraternity, too, is a faith, one that brothers put in each other when they lock arms. The brother is not a fact or a given, but the effect of an oath and a faith, not nature, but a crediting or promise, indeed, a construction of patriarchy, while the demand to denaturalize the untouchable givenness of the brother is “deconstruction at work” (PF, 159), the work of a deconstructive politics.
finally [196]:Derrida’s analysis concludes, rightly in my judgment, because it is so close to his point of departure, with a discussion of Blanchot, whose work stands in very close proximity with that of Levinas (PF, 296). For Blanchot, “we must give up trying to know those to whom we are linked by something essential” and concede that, because we cannot enclose the friend within our knowledge, we can only speak to, but not about, the friend. Words touch words from across a distance that cannot be crossed, “from one shore to the other shore, speech responding to someone who speaks from the other shore.” The function of our speech is to greet or welcome one who exceeds us, a “who” to whom we speak, not a “what” about which we speak. The interval that separates us does not destroy the relation with the friend but defines its peculiar nature. For it is the very withdrawal of the friend that draws us out of ourselves toward the friend, in a ceaseless, albeit futile, act of going where we cannot go, in the happy futility of a pursuit that Blanchot calls le pas au-dela, the step (pas) beyond I can not (pas) take, the “passage” that is always made and always blocked. This interval does not confine us to solitude but summons up speech and communication, if only at times the speech of silent companionship. The nonknowing, then, would not be a matter of withholding confidences from each other, but an affirmation of the other that presupposes and affirms the “interruption of being” between us, that protects the unfathomability of the friend. So deep is this interval that we might be tempted to say that nothing essential is changed with death, that death makes this distance all the more profound. But that would be an illusion, for with death, we lose not only the proximity but also the distance of the friend, not only the approach but also the withdrawal. When we settle all our differences with the dead friend, that is a false and easy illusion, for the differences have in fact been erased. Speech “subsides,” authentic dialogue dies away, and we are left with imaginary dialogues and a memory that Blanchot calls a “deceptive consolation.” The memory of the friend is “thought’s profound grief,” which arises from thought’s higher knowledge that memory does not in truth remember, that memory is lost in oblivion. Thought “must accompany friendship into oblivion,” preserving the friend’s absence as such, into a simpler and more painful separation. In a passage calculated to confound common sense, Blanchot says that friendship is “unshared, without reciprocity,.., that which has passed leaving no trace. This is passivity’s response to the un-presence of the unknown.” This is the “disaster” that does not destroy friendship but without which there is no friendship, for friendship flourishes in the midst of the disaster.( n4)  n4.For the pertinent passages in Blanchot, see Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 291, and Writing the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 27.

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