Deleuze, Foucault, p31-2, 34:
Archaeology puts forward a distinction between two types of practical formations: the one ‘discursive’, involving statements, the other ‘non-discursive’, involving environment. For example, clinical medicine at the end of the eighteenth century is a discursive formation; but as such it relates to a mass and a population who depend on another kind of formation and so bring in non-discursive environments such as ‘institutions, political events, economic practices and processes’. Naturally, environments also produce statements, just as statements determine environments. but the fact remains that the two formations are heterogeneous, even though they may overlap: there is no correspondence or isomorphism, no direct causality or symbolization.n11 _The Archaeology of Knowledge_ therefore marked a turning point: it posited a firm distinction between the two forms but, as it proposed to define the form of statements, it contented itself with indicating the other forms in a negative way, as the ‘non-discurisve.’
_Discipline and Punish_ marks a new stage. Even a ‘thing’ like prison is seen as an environmental formation (the ‘prison’ environment) and a form of content (where the content is the prisoner). But this thing or form does not refer back to a ‘word’ designating it, or to a signifier for which it would be the signified. It refers to completely different words and concepts, such as delinquency or delinquent, which express a new way of articulating infractions, sentences and their subjects. Let us call this formation of statements a _form of expression._ The two forms may have emerged at the same time, in the eighteenth century, but they are still none the less heterogeneous.
Penal law undergoes a development that obliges it to speak of crime and punishment in terms of the defense of society (and no longer in terms of vengeance or the restoration of [pg32] sovereign power): signs addressed to the soul or mind which establish certain mental associations between the crime and the punishment (a code). But prison is a new way of acting on bodies, and evolves form something entirely different to penal law: ‘Prisons, that concentrated and austere figure of all disciplines, is not an endogenous element in the penal system as defined at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’n12 Penal law concerns those aspects of criminal material that can be articulated: it is a system of language that classifies and translates offences and calculates sentences; a family of statements that is also a threshold. Prison, for its part, is concerned with whatever is visible: not only does it wish to display the crime and the criminal but in itself it constitutes a visibility. it is a system of light before being a figure of stone, and is defined by ‘Panopticism’: by a visual assemblages and a luminous environment (a central tower surrounded by cells) in which the warder can see all the detainees without the detainees being able to see either him or one another.n13
….[pg 34]So the the abstract formula of Panopticism is no longer ‘to see without being seen’ but _to impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity._ We need only insist that the multiplicity is reduced and confined to a tight space and that the imposition of a form of conduct is done by distributing in space, laying out and serializing in time, composing in space-time, and so on.n17 The list is endless, but it is always concerned with unformed and unorganized matter and unformalized, unfinalized functions, the two variables being indissolubly linked.
What can we call such a new informal dimension? On one occasion Foucault gives it its most precise name: it is a ‘diagram’, that is to say a ‘functioning, abstracted from any obstacle […] or friction [and which] must be detached from any specific use’.n18 The _diagram_ is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and in terms of form makes no distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a non-dicursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes other see and speak.